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Abstract 
This article questions the relevance of the different measures of policy performance that are 
currently used by international organizations. It evaluates more especially the pertinence of the 
World Bank's CPIA and of the various alternatives that have been proposed. Using a cross-
country panel dataset over 146 “developing” countries between 1977 and 2008, I show that the 
CPIA is a blunt and biased tool that can and should be improved upon. In particular, I show 
that while the CPIA is correlated with current growth, it is not a good predictor for future 
growth. I thus argue in favor of other measures of policy performance. First, I underline the 
need of introducing new criteria when measuring policy performance, in particular proxies for 
the development of fiscal capacity (e.g. domestic tax revenues) and the quality of industrial 
policy (e.g. export promotion strategies). This is of particular importance to bring sustained 
growth to sub-Saharan countries. Second, focusing more specifically on the allocation of 
development aid, I show that performance-based measures—as opposed to measures implying 
ex ante conditionality like the CPIA—are more accurate instruments for aid allocation. Finally, I 
make concrete proposals for the development of new performance indicators: the idea is to use 
“aid effectiveness” to allocate aid selectively. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This article questions the relevance of the different measures of policy performance that 
are currently used. It especially evaluates the pertinence of the World Bank's Country Policy 
and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) and of the various alternatives that have been proposed in 
the literature. It argues in favor of new measures of policy performance. 
Measuring policy performance is of particular importance today. First, the current global 
economic crisis has been very harmful for developing countries, in particular sub-Saharan 
countries, with a slowdown of capital flows, trade flows, flows of remittances and development 
aid flows. Development aid is both a limited and needed resources for developing countries. 
Finding criteria to allocate it selectively is thus of great concern for donors.  
Second, finding an accurate measure of policy performance is of particular importance 
in the context of sub-Saharan countries which, despite the revival of growth in the past decade, 
have made little progress on the path to “sustained” growth. No important structural changes 
have taken place in the majority of sub-Saharan countries. Striking is the fact that the share of 
manufacturing and formal sector employment are still declining in these countries. A good 
measure of policy performance has thus to be concerned, with policies that would bring about 
economic transformations, structural changes and sustained growth. I discuss the relevance of 
existing indicators and propose a new approach in light of these concerns. 
Using a yearly panel dataset over 146 developing and emerging countries between 1977 
and 2008, I first show that the CPIA is correlated with current growth rates. This 
contemporaneous correlation can by explained in part by the fact that the assessments of the 
World Bank staff are colored by perceptions of countries current performances. Next I show 
that the CPIA is not a good predictor for future economic growth. I also find a positive and 
statistically significant correlation between developing countries’ votes in the United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA) with those of the United States and their CPIA scores. This is 
obviously subject to a variety of interpretations about causality, but it can be seen as an 
indication of the influence of a pro-United States disposition in foreign policy on the CPIA. At 
the very least, this shows that whatever matters, it is more strongly correlated to UN votes that 
to future growth prospects, which seems odd. 
I thus argue in favor of other measures of policy performance. First, I underline the need 
for introducing new criteria when measuring policy performance. In particular, I show that 
more weight has to be given to the development of state capacities, which supposes to take into 
account its fiscal capacity. Fiscal capacity is indeed of crucial importance for raising domestic 
tax revenues. One has to go further that just underlying the need for “good institutions” when 
emphasizing the role of the state. Moreover, I underline the importance of the quality of 
industrial policy and especially of export promotion strategies on the path towards sustained 
growth.  
I then focus more specifically on the allocation of development aid, which is of great 
importance given both the scarcity and need for aid. I show that performance-based measures, 
as opposed to measures implying ex ante conditionality, are more accurate instruments for aid 
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allocation. In particular, I discuss the relevance of the Kanbur’s proposal (Kanbur, 2005) of 
introducing some “outcome criteria” in the CPIA. I show that introducing straightforward 
outcome variables will be a significant improvement on the CPIA but will leave some 
difficulties unsolved. 
Finally, I make concrete proposals for the development of new performance indicators. 
The basic idea beyond these indicators would be to use “aid effectiveness” to allocate aid 
selectively. Such indicators were supposed to compute one “aid effectiveness” coefficient per 
country and year. I show how this can be done using the “local Gaussian-weighted ordinary 
least squares” econometric method. 
1.1. RELATED LITERATURE 
This paper is first related to the literature which evaluates the relevance of the existing 
indicators measuring policy performance. The main focus of this literature is the World Bank.3 
Kurtz and Schrank (2007) evaluate the World Bank's coding of “good governance” by exploiting 
the time-dimension of the data. Using Granger-style causality tests, they found weak support 
for the notion that “better governance” was connected with successive improvements in 
growth. Other studies focus more specifically on the CPIA. Since the CPIA data was not 
disclosed until recently, they mainly emanate from the World Bank. For example, Gelb Ngo and 
Ye (2004) show that CPIA ratings have been quite strongly associated with medium-run growth 
performance. On the contrary, in a review of the performance-based allocation system, the 
World Bank (World Bank, 2001) underlines that, on average, CPIA ratings may be considerably 
affected by contemporaneous growth, with only modest predictive power with respect to future 
growth or poverty reduction. This is consistent with the empirical findings I obtain in this 
paper. Kraay and Nehru (2004) use CPIA ratings and find a significant inverse correlation 
between the quality of a country's policies and institutions on the one hand and its probability 
of debt distress on the other hand. Outside of the World Bank, however, other articles are much 
more critical toward the CPIA. For example, Herman (2004) calls for appreciating the 
weaknesses of this indicator, especially its low ability to discriminate among countries or over 
time. This paper contributes to this debate by analyzing both conceptually and empirically the 
relevance of the CPIA. 
This paper is also related to the literature which proposes alternatives to the CPIA or 
other performance indicators.  
Kanbur (2005) argues in favor of introducing some outcome variables in the CPIA. His 
proposal is in the spirit of Collier et. al. (1997)'s outcomes-based allocation. They indeed propose 
a basis for aid allocation in terms of retrospective assessment of a few major outcomes such as 
growth. Similarly, Barder and Birdsall (2006) defend the idea of payments for progress. I 
                                                     
3 An exception is Stuckler et. al (2009) who show, using the EBRD's own data, that the EBRD's indices of progress in 
market reforms are biased in the direction of positive growth. 
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contribute to this literature by opening the way for a new indicator that improves upon the 
previous proposals that have been done. 
Finally, this paper is related to a growing literature on optimal aid allocation, which 
emphasizes the necessity to take into account the level of policies as a selectivity criterion. This 
necessity was first highlighted by Burnside and Dollar (2000) and further examined in the 
World Bank report Assessing Aid (World Bank, 1998). Using these findings, Collier and Dollar 
(1999) derive an effective allocation of aid in terms of poverty reduction and compare it to the 
current allocation. They find out that the current allocation is radically different from the 
allocation which would be effective on poverty reduction. They stress the fact that an optimal 
allocation of aid not only depends on levels of poverty but also on the political environment. 
Moreover, they further develop this idea by applying their approach to the dynamic question of 
poverty reduction Collier and Dollar (2001). Cogneau and Naudet (2007) propose an alternative 
allocation based on the principle of equality of opportunity: they take into account structural 
growth handicaps rather than the quality of past policies (see also Llavador and Roemer, 2001). 
In the same spirit, Wood (2007) presents a more general model of optimal allocation of aid, in 
which donors take into account future poverty as well as current poverty. Finally, Amprou et. 
al. (2006) argue in favor of considering vulnerability to exogenous shocks and low level of 
human capital as selectivity criteria. All this literature takes the level of policy or of performance 
in the effective use of development assistance as given. On the contrary in this article, I try to 
determine the optimal performance indicator one can use in the selectivity formula for aid 
allocation. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents descriptive evidence 
about the CPIA and assesses its relevance. Section 3 provides new ways to improving upon the 
CPIA. Section 4 concludes. 
2. THE CPIA, A GOOD MEASURE OF POLICY PERFORMANCE? 
One of the most influential tools for measuring policy performance as of today is the 
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), which is the World Bank's tool. In this 
section, I analyze the relevance of this tool as a measure of policy performance. 
2.1. SOME HISTORY OF THE CPIA 
Since 1977, the World Bank has carried out an annual performance assessment of its 
client countries' capacity to effectively absorb development assistance. This assessment, the 
CPIA, is one of the main criteria used to allocate International Development Assistance (IDA) 
resources between low-income developing countries. The CPIA is an assessment tool for the 
Bank, to gauge the likely return to development assistance in specific countries and to guide 
IDA allocations to countries below the income threshold. CPIA assessments do not directly 
reflect specific “outcome” criteria as set out in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)—
e.g. poverty reduction, school enrollment, maternal health, etc.—neither do they directly rest on 
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proxy outcome variables such as GDP, export or investment growth rates. The emphasis is on 
policy actions and institutional effectiveness. They rely on the judgments of technical analysts to 
assess how well a country's policy and institutional framework fosters poverty reduction, 
sustainable growth and the effective use of development assistance (Gelb, Ngo and Ye, 2004).4 
Ratings are against specific criteria but are subjective. Indeed, the CPIAs are produced by the 
Bank's own staff, i.e. its country teams. 
In the past, CPIA results were not made available to the public. Only recently have 
governments themselves, whose policies are assessed in a particular CPIA, come to be informed 
of the numerical ratings on a confidential basis. Since 2000, there has been a public quintile-
based disclosure.5 The exact numerical values of the CPIA have been disclosed starting with the 
results of the 2005 CPIA exercise. They are fully available to the public today. 
The criteria used in the CPIAs have evolved over the years, in response to new analytical 
insights and lessons the Bank feels it has learned from experience. Originally called Country 
Performance Ratings (CPR), the assessment exercise acquired the name CPIA with the 1998 
redesign to emphasize that it was the policy and institutional environment that was being 
assessed, not economic outcomes. The definition of the criteria, their relative importance, the 
rating and disclosure procedures have undergone important changes over the years (van 
Waeyenberge, 2006). 
(A) THE 1980'S 
Significantly, during the 1980's, the emphasis moved from an initial concern with both 
policy inputs and economic performance indicators (growth and savings rates), to a 
predominant concern with policy inputs. By the early 1990s, an exclusive emphasis on policy 
inputs prevailed. 
In the early 1980s, four criteria were cited in the following order of priority as affecting 
IDA's resource allocation: 
1. National poverty as measured through income per capita; 
2. Creditworthiness; 
3. Economic performance to be assessed in terms of macro indicators including growth 
and saving rates, but also in terms of the quality of “administration and economic 
management” together with “the speed and direction of change;”  
4. Project readiness. 
                                                     
4 Indeed, according to the World Bank, the aim of the CPIA is to assess «how conducive [a country's policy and 
institutional] framework is to fostering poverty reduction, sustainable growth and the effective use of development 
assistance» (World Bank, 2007).  
5  With the quintile-based results for the CPIA, its four clusters, the country portfolio, and the IDA Country 
Performance (ICP) rating posted on the Bank's extemal website, as well as the criteria and the methodology of the 
performance-based allocation system. 
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Guidelines on the allocation of lending among IDA-eligible countries issued in 1989 
were characterized by a shift in emphasis towards greater consideration of policy performance.  
According to Kapur et. al. (1997), Bank staff was instructed to rate a country's 
performance in each of three policy categories: (i) short-run economic management (mainly of 
demand); (ii) long-run economic management (mainly supply side restructuring); and (iii) the 
country's poverty-alleviation record as characterized by its delivery of social services, together 
with reforms removing “distortions” from labor markets and from rural-urban terms of trade. 
As a result, the 1991 CPIA exercise had three component clusters: (i) short-term economic 
management; (ii) long-term economic management; and (iii) poverty alleviation policies. 
(B) THE 1990'S AND 2000'S 
In 1997, criteria covering governance-related issues were added, and in 1998 the CPIA 
process was revised to add a benchmarking phase.6 
In 2001, several changes were introduced that included establishing a written record, 
providing detailed guidance for criteria with several subcomponents, broadening the set of 
benchmark countries, revising the content of the criteria and defining the different rating levels 
(previously only the 2 and 5 rating levels were fully defined). A review took place in 2004, when 
the Bank commissioned an external panel to review the CPIA ratings and methodology. The 
panel made a number of recommendations: (i) simplify CPIA criteria from 20 to 16; (ii) 
undertake analytic work to better inform the weighting of the various criteria; (iii) reconsider 
the weight given to the “governance factor”; (iv) provide country authorities with an 
opportunity for comment on the assessments; (v) establish an independent committee to review 
the CPIA methodology every three years; and (vi) fully disclose the numerical ratings of the 
2005 CPIA exercise for IDA borrowers. The criteria were revised in 2004 to take the 
recommendations made by the panel into account. 
As shown in Table 4 in the Data Appendix, the CPIA currently comprises 16 criteria 
divided into four clusters. It is split into two groups, the CPIA Cluster A-C (Economic 
Management; Structural Policies; Policies for Social Inclusion/Equity), and the CPIA Cluster D 
(Governance Rating: Public Sector Management and Institutions). The CPIA Cluster A-C 
includes 11 items and the CPIA Cluster D includes 5 items. 
The economic management cluster comprises three specific criteria: (i) macroeconomic 
management; (ii) fiscal policy; and (iii) debt policy. 
                                                     
6 “The benchmarking phase helps ensure that, given the criteria, the ratings are set at the right level and are 
consistent across countries and Regions. The Bank's six Regions, the Networks, and Central Departments assist in 
selecting a representative sample of countries that covers all six Regions, includes IBRD and IDA-eligible borrowers, 
good as well as poor performers, and has a ratings distribution similar to the overall distribution of the CPIA country 
scores. The set of benchmark countries is reviewed every year, taking into account the need to both maintain some 
continuity in the sample and to refresh it. At the onset of each year's exercise, the set of benchmark countries is 
communicated to the Regions and Networks, along with the timetable for the exercise. “ (World Bank, 2007) 
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The structural policies cluster contains three criteria: (i) policies and institutions for 
economic cooperation, regional integration and trade; (ii) financial sector; (iii) business 
regulatory environment. 
The policies for social inclusion/equity cluster have five criteria: (i) gender equality; (ii) 
equity of public resource use; (iii) building human resources; (iv)social protection and labor; 
and (v) environmental policies and regulations.  
Finally, the governance rating cluster comprises five criteria: (i) property rights and rule-
based governance; (ii) quality of budgetary and financial management; (iii) efficiency of revenue 
mobilization; (iv) quality of public administration; and (v) transparency, accountability, and 
corruption in the public sector (World Bank, 2008). 
Moreover, each criterion includes a series of sub-indicators through the guidelines that I 
will not detail here but that are available online. For example, the macroeconomic management 
criterion can be divided into three sub-indicators: (i) monetary/exchange rate policy with clearly 
defined price stability objectives; (ii) aggregate demand policies focus on maintaining short and 
medium-term external balance; (iii) avoiding crowding out private investment.  
Using the guidelines, the Bank's country team gives a score to every country comprised 
between 1 and 6 for each of the 16 criteria and gives each cluster the same weight in producing 
the overall country assessment.7 
(C) THE 2010'S 
What is striking is that despite the economic crisis and the evaluation of the CPIA 
released by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) in 2009 (IEG, 2009), the criteria used in the 
CPIA as of today (2012) are exactly the same than those of 2008. The only difference is that 
“macroeconomic management” is now called “monetary and exchange rate policies.” 
The main recommendation of the IEG was to “strengthen the use of financial indicators in 
the CPIA write-ups” (IEG, 2009) as if finance was but the only important thing to bring about 
sustained growth. This is especially striking given the fact that we know from the literature that 
there is a key trade-off between safe and sound finance on the one hand and the risk-taking in 
financial sectors’ intermediation between savers and investors on the other hand. Moreover the 
pattern of the financial sector maturation varies considerably among countries. It has been 
widely showed that financial instability can lead to poor economic growth. For example, 
Williamson and Mahar (1998) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (2001) have shown that financial 
opening preceded most crises. Griffith-Jones (2000) similarly underlines that international 
markets are inherently unstable due to information asymmetries. Hence it seems that the World 
Bank, at least from the CPIA point of view, has learned little from the crisis. 
As I emphasize below, there is nothing in the CPIA that is related to what could bring 
sustained growth to developing countries. 
                                                     
7 More precisely, for each criterion, countries are rated on a scale of 2 (weak) to 5 (strong), and a country is rated a 1 if 
it is very weak for two years or more and a 6 if it is very strong for three years or more. 
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2.2 DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE 
In this paper, I use the annual series of the CPIA for 146 countries between 1977 and 
2008. 
Interestingly enough, despite the fundamental changes in the CPIA design described 
above and despite a general understanding that developing country policies have improved on 
average since 1977, average CPIA results across countries have remained remarkably steady 
between 1977 and 2008. This appears clearly in Figure 1(a).8  
Moreover, CPIA results have been concentrating increasingly around the median 
(Figure 1(b)). One can argue that this steadiness comes from the fact that some developing 
countries have improved substantially while others have declined. However, in this case, the 
standard deviation of the CPIA ratings should have risen, whereas it appears that it has 
decreased since 1985 (Figure 1(c)). According to Gelb, Ngo and Ye (2004), some inertia is to be 
expected in the ratings because they assess institutions and capacity to implement policies 
rather than just “stroke-of-the-pen” policy changes. This can cause CPIA scores to lag reform 
efforts, as better policies can require time to become properly reflected in the ratings. However, 
the concentration of the results around the same median for thirty years cannot be explained by 
such a lag, which leads us to question the current relevance of the CPIA. Indeed, if the CPIA 
criteria have changed while at the same time the scores have remained the same, one can argue 
that there is some “hidden conditionality” in the CPIA. I come back to this point below. 
However, one can also propose alternative explanations to this empirical fact, especially the fact 
that the CPIA is a way to grade countries in a “relative” rather than an “absolute” way, the goal 
being to sort countries for aid allocation purposes. But this does not explained the decrease in 
standard deviations, or the higher concentration around the median.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
8 Similarly, Herman (2004) emphasizes that “although the index was substantially revised in 1998 (and again in 2001) and 
smaller revisions are made each year, neither the changes in the structure of the CPIA nor in the definitions of individual items 
seemed to cause significant changes in the rating scores, at least through 2000.” See also World Bank, 2010. 
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Figure 1: Descriptive Evidence on CPIA, 1977-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: These figures present some annual descriptive statistics of the CPIA between 1977 and 2008. 
Figure 1(a) plots the average annual value of the CPIA. Figure 1(b) plots the annual median value of the 
CPIA. Figure 1(c) plots the annual standard deviation of the CPIA.  
Source: CPIA data, World Bank. 
 
If we now look at the average CPIA score by regions, some differences across regions 
appear (Figure 2). At the end of the 1970s, South Asia had the lowest score with an average 
score below 3 (Figure 2(e)), followed by Sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 2(a)). However, Asia 
improved its rating since the end of the 1980s much more than Sub-Saharan Africa. Latin 
America and the Caribbean also improve their rating during the 1990s (Figure 2(b)). The region 
which has the best average CPIA score today is Eastern Europe and Central Asia which, despite 
a slight decrease during the 1990s, is back to its end of the 1970s average score (Figure 2(d)). 
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However, despite these small changes, it is important to underscore that the average 
CPIA score for each region has been incredibly stable during the 1977-2008 period. This again 
goes in the direction of those arguing that there may be today some hidden conditionality that 
comes with the CPIA. 
2.3. THE RELEVANCE OF THE CPIA: REVIEW OF THE EXISTING EVALUATIONS 
(A) EX ANTE CONDITIONALITY 
The first caveat of the CPIA is that it relies on policies rather than on outcomes. From 
this point of view, it corresponds to a model of “ex ante conditionality.” The main problem of ex 
ante conditionality is that until now it has never worked. As underlined by Stiglitz (1999), “good 
policies cannot be bought.” 
What is often heard in the public opinion, the criteria on which the CPIA relies are for a 
very large majority considered as important determinants of growth, poverty reduction and 
effective use of aid in the literature and are not object of current controversies. A possible 
interpretation of this finding is that the CPIA may have experienced remarkable changes during 
the last years with the disappearance of the explicit mention of a set of policy imperatives. For 
example, it appears that certain lessons of the post-Washington Consensus, such as the hazards 
of capital account liberalization and the fragility of the financial sector in developing Stiglitz 
(1998(b)) have filtered through into Bank practice. From this point of view, the CPIA seems to 
have acquired more relevance. 
However, as van Waeyenberge (2006) suggests, the meaning of these changes is open to 
a second possible interpretation. The question could be raised as to whether those imperatives 
that have disappeared from the narrative guidelines of the CPIAs may have somehow become 
“embedded” and now steer the CPIA exercise in less visible ways. Van Waeyenberge (2006) 
illustrates this point with the assessment of trade policy in the 2004 CPIA questionnaire (World 
Bank, 2004). This questionnaire focuses exclusively on the policy framework regarding trade in 
goods, without reference to the rules and regulations affecting capital flows. The narrative 
guidelines on the assessment of the financial sector, in turn, do not make explicit reference to 
issues regarding foreign investors, state ownership or directed credit. However, van 
Waeyenberge (2006) argues that closer scrutiny of the guideposts that accompany the narrative 
guidelines for these respective policy/institutional categories reveals how these specific policy 
imperatives have in fact been subsumed in the “diagnostic reports” that now serve as 
guideposts to staff's assessment: “these typically embody a bias in favor of foreign investment and 
trade, and are anchored in a framework of traditional welfare economics where government intervention 
is tolerated only in the context of static market failure.” 
This point follows the lines of those arguing that there is hidden conditionality in the 
CPIA. This could help explain at least in part the surprising steadiness of the CPIA scores 
despite the important changes in the criteria. 
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Figure 2: Descriptive Evidence (Average) on CPIA by Region, 1977-2008 
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Note: These Figures present the average annual value of the CPIA by region. Figure 2(a) plots the 
average annual value of the CPIA for Sub-Saharan Africa; Figure 2(b) for Latin America and the 
Caribbean; Figure 2(c) for the Middle East and North Africa; Figure 2(d) for Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia; Figure 2(e) for South Asia and Figure 2(f) for East Asia and the Pacific.  
Source: CPIA data, World Bank. 
(B) A ONE-SIZE-FITS-ALL APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT 
Another caveat of the CPIA is that it relies too much on a “one-size-fits-all” approach to 
development while it has been shown in the literature that “there is no universal recipe” (Barder 
and Birdsall, 2006).9 This point is made in Kanbur (2005) as well as in Cage (2009 (b)). For 
example as to growth, Cage (2009 (b)) underlines that growth-promoting policies tend to be 
context-specific: one has to take into account individual country experiences when analyzing 
the determinants of sustained growth. Even the World Bank seems to have accepted this new 
emphasis on country specificities. For example, drawing the lessons of the 1990s, the World 
Bank underlines that “there is no one right way to achieve development” and that “which options 
should be chosen depends on initial conditions, the quality of existing institutions, the history of policies, 
political economy factors, the external environment, and last but not least, the art of economic 
policymaking” (World Bank, 2005).  
The CPIA does not correspond to the empirical reality of development. Being the same 
for every country, it relies too heavily on a uniform model of what works in development policy 
(Kanbur, 2005). Even if this model were valid “on average,” the variations around the average 
make it an unreliable sole guide to the country-specific productivity of aid in achieving the final 
objectives of development. 
Moreover, the CPIA does not only rely on a uniform model of what works in 
development policy, but it does so by underlying very specific policies. This clearly appears if 
one considers the “Policies and Institutions for Economic Cooperation, Regional Integration & 
Trade” criterion and the “Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management” criterion. They are 
much more detailed than whatever can be found in the literature, relying on too specific 
quantitative policies. Moreover, whereas the literature insists on the necessity to set priorities, 
the CPIA seems to put everything on the same plan. 
Relying too heavily on a uniform model, the CPIA thus does not appear to be a good 
tool for allocating aid, at least conceptually. We show that it is even more the case empirically, 
since it is not a good predictor for economic growth. 
 
 
                                                     
9 Similarly, Hoff and Stiglitz (2011) emphasize that “there are clearly no surefire formulas for success; if there were, there 
would be more successes.” 
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2.4. IS THE CPIA A GOOD PREDICTOR FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH? AN 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
In this section, I test empirically whether the CPIA is a good predictor for economic, 
using an annual panel dataset over 146 countries between 1977 and 2008. 
(A) DATA DESCRIPTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
In order to determine whether the CPIA is a good predictor for economic growth, I run 
growth regressions with the CPIA score and the annual change in the CPIA as control variables 
in a panel of 146 developing countries over the 1977-2008 period.10 As a dependent variable, I 
use the growth rate of per capita GDP. Usual controls in cross-country growth equations, used 
for example in Levine and Renelt (1992), Ramey and Ramey (1995) and Aizenman and Marion 
(1999), are the initial log level of real GDP per capita; the initial fraction of the relevant 
population in secondary schools; the initial growth rate of the population; and the average share 
of trade in GDP over the period. However, since all these controls are fixed at the country level, 
I choose to introduce directly country fixed effects in all the specifications for robustness 
reasons. I also control for M2 as a share of GDP lagged one period and aid flows. Panel data on 
aid flows are taken from the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) annual series. 
Following Roodman (2006), I use the Net Aid Transfers (NAT) variable for measuring aid 
flows.11 Table 1 provides summary statistics for a few key statistics. 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics12 
                                          Mean / 
sd 
CPIA Score 3.16 
(0.77) 
CPIA Change 2.10 
(8.13) 
Per Capita Growth Rate 1.74 
(5.15) 
                                                     
10 For the description and the sources of the data in more details see the Data Appendix. 
11 NAT is a net transfer concept, net of both principle payments received on ODA loans and of interests received on 
such loans. Moreover, NAT excludes cancellation of old non-ODA loans since such cancellation generates little or no 
additional net transfers. 
12 Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations and the others are averages. Variables are described in the Data 
Appendix. 
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Aid/GDP 7.95 
(10.93) 
Observations 1095 
 
(B) EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
Equations are estimated using a panel of eight four-year periods from 1977-1980 through 
2005-2008. Thus, an observation is a country's performance average over a four-year period. The 
averaging over four-year, which is usual in the literature, allows me to avoid the non-
stationarity problem for the growth rate. 
The baseline empirical specification is: 
( )           CPIA Score    CPIA Change    X             
Where   index the countries and   stands for the eight four-year periods (from 1977-1980 
to 2005-2008).   is the growth rate of per capita GDP; “CPIA Score” is the average CPIA score 
over the period; and “CPIA Change” is the average of the annual change in CPIA rating over 
the period. X   is a vector of control variables that vary with the specification considered.    are 
country fixed effects;  
 
 period fixed effects; and     is a country-period shock. 
I estimate equation (1) using both OLS with robust standard errors and two-step 
Arellano-Bond GMM (Tables 2 and 3). The use of two-step Arellano-Bond GMM is driven by 
possible endogeneity concerns. The advantage of the system GMM method is that it helps to 
overcome endogeneity concerns in the absence of any strictly exogenous explanatory variables 
or instrument.13 The results are robust to both methodologies. 
(C) RESULTS 
Tables 2 and 3 presents the results of the impact of performance as measured by the 
CPIA score and the annual changes in this score on the growth rate of per capita GDP 
(estimation of equation (1)). I find a positive and statistically significant coefficient for the CPIA 
score using both OLS and two-step Arellano-Bond GMM (columns 1 and 2). I also find a 
positive impact of the annual change in the CPIA rating but it is not statistically robust to the 
use of two-step Arellano-Bond GMM. However, these estimates do not prove causality. As 
                                                     
13 When I estimate my regressions using two-step system GMM, I thus use the forward orthogonal deviations 
transform instead of first differencing because it maximizes the sample size in panel with gaps (Roodman (2006)). 
The forward orthogonal deviations transform is an alternative to differencing proposed by Arellando and Bover 
(1995) that preserves sample size in panel with gaps. Indeed, instead of subtracting the previous observation from the 
contemporaneous—what does the first-difference transform which thus magnifies gaps in unbalanced panels—it 
subtracts the average of all future available observations of a variable. No matter how many gaps, it is computable 
for all observations except the last for each individual, so it minimizes data loss. And since lagged observations do 
not enter the formula, they are valid instruments. 
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acknowledged by Gelb Ngo and Ye (2004) despite the use of clear benchmarks to derive CPIA 
ratings, it is possible that assessments are colored by perceptions of “how well the country is 
doing” which are influenced by recent growth trends. In this case, the positive coefficient I 
obtain for the CPIA score would simply reflect the fact that CPIA scores themselves respond to 
observed growth rates and so is not indicative of the fact that this score can be interpreted as a 
good predictor for growth rates.14 
In the “Staff Guidance Notes” used by the World Bank staff in order to measure policy 
performance, it is strongly emphasized that the only thing that has to be taken into account is 
the short term: “The write-up should focus on the developments of the past one calendar year (...). 
Unless absolutely necessary, staff are not expected to report developments of more than two years ago in 
the write-up.”; “Policy performance should be rated against the CPIA criteria, rather than the degree of 
improvements from the previous year, and in relation to the ratings of the benchmark countries.” This 
emphasis on the short term can explained while the assessments are colored by the current 
growth rates. 
In order to test whether or not the CPIA score can be interpreted as a good growth 
predictor, I introduce as a control variable the CPIA score lagged one period. Obviously, this 
cannot be determined by the current growth rate. But if I were to find a strong positive 
correlation between the CPIA score lagged one period and the following period growth rate, 
then the CPIA score could be interpreted as a good predictor of future growth.  
When I estimate equation (1) with this new control, I find a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient for the CPIA score lagged one period, using both OLS and two-step 
Arellano-Bond GMM (column 3). This means that the contemporaneous correlation between the 
CPIA score and the growth rate comes from the fact that assessments are colored by current 
perceptions of country performances. More importantly, this means that the CPIA score is a 
very bad predictor for future growth rates since the countries with the lowest CPIA scores one 
period ago are those that do better in terms of growth during the following period. Moreover, 
the coefficient for the CPIA score lagged one period is negative (and statistically significant for 
Arellano-Bond GMM) whether or not I include in the regression the current CPIA score 
(column 4). 
One can argue that these estimates do not distinguish between the effect of performance 
as measured by the CPIA and other influences on growth that may themselves reflect the CPIA 
rating. For example, growth in high-performing countries may be partly driven by increased 
AID flows in response to higher CPIA scores. In order to control for these other influences, I 
include aid flows normalized by GDP as a control variable (column 5) as well as the square of 
these flows to control for decreasing returns of aid (column 6). The introduction of these 
controls, whether I use OLS and Arellano-Bond GMM estimations, or 2SLS and 2-step feasible 
                                                     
14 Similarly, Glaeser et al (2004) underline that indicators measuring the quality of institutions, supposed to explain 
economic growth, are in fact the result and not the cause of economic growth. 
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IV/GMM in order to control for aid endogeneity, does not change the results (columns 5, 6 and 
7).15 
 Finally one can claim that the negative and statistically significant coefficient I obtain for 
the CPIA score lagged one period comes from the presence of some outliers in the sample. In 
order to check whether this is the case, I identify influential observations using the method of 
Hadi (1992), which classifies nine observations as outliers at the 5 percent level.16 Removing 
these observations does not change the results (column 8). 
The negative coefficient I obtain for the CPIA score lagged one period thus seems to be 
robust. It appears that the CPIA is not a good predictor of economic growth. 
 
Table 2 : OLS and 2SLS Estimation17 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
CPIA Score 1.819*** 1.561*** 1.954***  1.957*** 
 -0.352 -0.408 -0.406  -0.41 
CPIA Change  0.060* 0.015  0.015 
  -0.032 -0.036  -0.035 
(One-Period) Lag of CPIA 
Score 
  -0.923** -0.348 -0.981** 
   -0.423 -0.419 -0.435 
Period and Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Aid No No No No Yes 
Aid Square No No No No No 
Outliers Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-sq 0.48 0.53 0.54 0.51 0.54 
Observations 766 748 734 734 722 
 
                                                     
15 In columns 6 and 7 aid flows are instrumented by the correlation of the country votes with those of the US in the 
UNGA lagged one period. 
16 Angola in the 2005-2008 period; Azerbaijan in the 1993-1996 and 2005-2008 periods; Equatorial Guinea in the 1997-
2000 and 2001-2004 periods; Liberia in the 1989-1992 and 1997-2000 periods; Tajikistan in the 1993-1996 period; and 
Ukraine in the 1993-1996 period. 
17 * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Table 2 reports OLS and 2SLS estimates. Table 3 reports Arellano-Bond GMM 
estimates The unit of observation is a country/period. Standard errors in parentheses are robust. The dependent 
variable is the growth rate of per capita GDP. The endogenous variable for the 2SLS estimations are the aid ows. The 
excluded exogenous variable for the 2SLS estimations is the correlation of the country votes with those of the US in 
the UNGA lagged one period. All the regressions include M2 as a share of GDP as a control. The controls are 
described in more details in the text. 
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 6 7 8 
 OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
 b/se b/se b/se 
CPIA Score 1.889*** 1.958*** 2.297*** 
 -0.425 -0.568 -0.426 
CPIA Change 0.014 0.005 -0.032 
 -0.035 -0.038 -0.032 
(One-Period) Lag of CPIA 
Score 
-0.993** -0.954** -0.855** 
 -0.436 -0.468 -0.361 
Period and Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Aid Yes Yes Yes 
Aid Square Yes No No 
Outliers Included Yes Yes No 
R-sq 0.54 0.49 0.56 
Observations 722 658 653 
 
Table 3: GMM Estimation18 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
CPIA Score 1.766*** 1.516*** 1.446***  1.491*** 
 -0.365 -0.343 -0.338  -0.339 
CPIA Change  0.042 0.006  0.008 
  -0.031 -0.036  -0.037 
(One-Period) Lag of CPIA 
Score 
  -
1.205*** 
-
1.433*** 
-
1.271*** 
   -0.42 -0.362 -0.427 
Period and Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Aid No No No No Yes 
Aid Square No No No No No 
Outliers Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 591 571 559 563 547 
 
                                                     
18 18 * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Table 2 reports OLS and 2SLS estimates. Table 3 reports Arellano-Bond GMM 
estimates The unit of observation is a country/period. Standard errors in parentheses are robust. The dependent 
variable is the growth rate of per capita GDP. The endogenous variable for the 2SLS estimations are the aid ows. The 
excluded exogenous variable for the 2SLS estimations is the correlation of the country votes with those of the US in 
the UNGA lagged one period. All the regressions include M2 as a share of GDP as a control. The controls are 
described in more details in the text. 
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6 7 8 
 
GMM 
IV 
GMM 
IV 
GMM 
 
b/se b/se b/se 
CPIA Score 1.487*** 1.958*** 2.297*** 
 
-0.345 -0.561 -0.42 
CPIA Change 0.008 0.005 -0.032 
 
-0.037 -0.038 -0.032 
(One-Period) Lag of CPIA 
Score -1.280*** -0.954** -0.855** 
 
-0.427 -0.463 -0.357 
Period and Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Aid Yes Yes Yes 
Aid Square Yes No No 
Outliers Included Yes Yes No 
Observations 547 656 651 
 
 (a) VOTES IN THE UNGA 
I finally find that there is a strong and statistically significant positive correlation 
between the CPIA scores of developing countries and the correlation of their votes with those of 
the US in the UNGA. This appears clearly in Figure 3. For each year between 2000 and 2008, I 
plot the relationship between the correlation of the votes with those of the US in the UNGA and 
the CPIA score of the countries. It appears clearly that this relationship is positive and 
statistically significant: the higher the correlation of the votes, the higher the CPIA score. 
Obviously, correlation is not causality, but it seems hard to find an intuitive causal link 
going from the CPIA score to the correlation of the vote in the UNGA. On the contrary, one can 
argue that CPIA scores are biased in favor of countries having political links with the US. 
Moreover, if one remembers that the literature on aid allocation has shown that aid may be 
used to buy political support from the recipients of aid (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Alesina and 
Weder, 2002; Schraeder et. al., 1998; Kuziemko and Werker, 2006), another interpretation could 
be that countries to which the World Bank is willing to give more aid received a higher CPIA 
score in order for these countries to effectively receive more aid through the Bank allocation 
formula. Whatever the precise sense in which that might or might not be the case, this questions 
the relevance of the CPIA. 
 
Figure 3: CPIA Score and the Correlation of the Votes with those of the US in the UNGA, 2000-2008 
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These Figures present for each year between 2000 and 2008 correlation between the CPIA scores of 
developing countries and the correlation of their votes with those of the US in the UNGA.  
Source: CPIA data are from the World Bank; Correlation of the Votes with those of the US in the UNGA 
data has been constructed by the author using UNGA Votes data from Erik Voeten. 
 
The CPIA, despite all the recent modifications and improvements that have been made 
and need to be acknowledged, thus still appears as a blunt and biased tool that can and should 
be improved upon. 
3. HOW CAN WE IMPROVE UPON THE CPIA? 
In this section I first underline the fact that other criteria, and in particular the role of the 
state and the quality of industrial policy need to be taken into account into the CPIA. Focusing 
more specifically on the allocation of development aid, I then consider the alternative proposals 
to the CPIA that have been formulated in the literature and in particular the one of Kanbur 
(2005). I finally make concrete proposals for the development of new possible allocations based 
on the idea of using “aid effectiveness” as an allocation tool. 
3.1. INTRODUCING NEW CRITERIA INTO THE CPIA 
There is still nothing in these criteria related to what could bring sustained growth to 
developing countries, for example fiscal capacity or industrial policy. The words “fiscal 
capacity” or “industrial policy” do not even appear in the 103 pages of the “Staff Guidance 
Notes” for the 2012 CPIA. As I will underline it below, there is similarly nothing on export 
promotion strategies despite the fact that it is widely acknowledged that all successful 
liberalizations either explicitly or implicitly promoted export growth. The CPIA only 
emphasizes the necessity to remove trade restrictions. 
(A) THE ROLE OF STATE BUILDING AND FISCAL CAPACITY 
The CPIA clearly underestimates the role that a well-functioning government can and 
must play in the development process. This is striking when one considers the “trade criteria” 
in which it is underlined that “MFN tariffs have been streamlined into a limited number of tariff bands 
in many countries, so CPIA ratings should reflect how distortionary is the overall structure of trade 
taxes, including not just tariffs but also other border taxes.” 
From this point of view, the CPIA totally ignores the fiscal consequences of trade 
liberalization, while trade liberalization can have a very negative impact for developing 
countries in terms of tax revenues as shown by Cage and Gadenne (2012). Trade taxes are 
indeed an important source of revenue for developing countries. These revenues have fallen 
over the past decades as these countries liberalized trade. Many developing countries 
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simultaneously experienced a decrease in their total tax revenues. These appears clearly in 
Figure 4 from Cage and Gadenne (2012). Using a novel panel dataset of tax revenues and 
government expenditures in developing countries between 1945 and 2006, Cage and Gadenne 
(2012) identify 110 episodes of decreases in tariff revenues. They show that less than half of the 
countries recover the lost tax revenues 5 years after the start of the episode. Moreover they find 
a similar picture when they consider government expenditures. 
 
Figure 4: Evolution of tax revenues as a share of GDP, 1975-2005 (Cage and Gadenne, 2012)  
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Note: All values are median values for the country group and time period considered. The sample 
includes in each time period 26 low income countries, 40 middle income countries and 32 high income 
countries.  
Source: Cage and Gadenne (2012). 
 
The questions are thus the following: how to deliver a proper education, health and 
infrastructure system with tax revenues representing less than 15 percent of GDP, creating a 
clear competitive disadvantage for developing countries? And how to bring sustained growth 
without a proper education, health and infrastructure system? In order to levy domestic taxes—
and so to be able to open itself to international trade—a country needs pre-existing tax capacity. 
These tax capacities are not taking into account in the CPIA. I argue in favor of their inclusion as 
one of the main criterion rather than only emphasizing the necessity to remove trade 
restrictions. 
(B) EXPORT PROMOTION POLICIES 
Similarly, while the CPIA only emphasizes the necessity to remove trade restrictions, 
efficient export promotion policies may have an important role to play and should be taken into 
account. Cage and Rouzet (2012) show for example that export subsidies may have a positive 
welfare effect on exporting developing countries by improving both the average quality of their 
exports and their terms of trade. They study the effect of firm and country reputations (the 
famous “made in” label) on exports when buyers cannot observe quality prior to purchase. 
Measuring national reputations by analyzing the content of US newspaper articles about foreign 
countries over the period 1988-2006, they find that more positive news coverage of foreign 
countries and companies is associated with higher unit values of the exports to the United 
States, particularly in sectors with larger scope for vertical differentiation. They rationalize this 
finding in a model in which firm-level demand is determined by expected quality which 
depends on both past experience with good and country of origin’s reputation. Asymmetric 
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information acts as barrier to entry for high-quality firms but facilitates sales by “fly-by-night” 
low-quality firms. Countries with a bad quality reputation can thus be locked into exporting 
low-quality, low-cost goods. In this case, export subsidies have a positive welfare effect on 
exporting countries. 
The findings of this paper are consistent with the success of some export-led growth 
strategies for developing countries. East Asian economies in particular pursued a few decades 
ago strategies consisting on exporting low-quality, low-cost goods and gradually moving up to 
higher quality, higher unit value goods.19 China is currently attempting to follow the same path. 
This is for example the strategy of Lenovo, the only Chinese company to get a worldwide 
sponsorship for the Beijing Olympics. With a Western sounding name, the legacy of IBM brand 
name and technology and the chief executive from Dell and NCR, Lenovo Group is not a 
company that most Americans would assume is Chinese. This is exactly what the company 
aims for, although Lenovo’s largest shareholder is the Chinese government, because it is aware 
of fact that the American consumer associates Chinese products with cheap and unreliable. 
Without policy intervention, moving up to higher quality exportations may not be 
feasible if the economy is trapped in a self-fulfilling low equilibrium, in which country’s 
reputation for low quality prevents high-quality firms from entering the export markets. In this 
case, a successful export promotion policy would consist in subsidizing exporters’ initial losses 
or investing public resources into raising country’s perception abroad. This is why the quality of 
the industrial policy—and for example the fact of having an efficient export promotion 
strategy—has to be taken into account in the CPIA. 
3.2. CRITERIA FOR AID ALLOCATION 
One of the main uses of the CPIA is as a criterion in the development aid allocation 
formula. Indeed, when a country is eligible to the International Development Association 
(IDA)—the development aid agency of the World Bank—the IDA formula to allocate aid is 
made of four different terms: (i) the CPIA; (ii) the portfolio performance which is used to 
determine a rating for each country's implementation performance; (iii) population; and (iv) per 
capita income.20 The combination of the CPIA and of the portfolio performance forms the 
Country Performance Rating (CPR): 
                                                     
19 At the end of the Second World War, “Made in Japan” goods had the reputation of being cheap low-quality goods. 
Japanese companies were suffering from an inferior “national brand.” Currently, Japanese cars and electronics 
ranked among the most reliable in all consumer surveys. Japan’s pattern of specialization in manufactures has 
evolved dramatically. Japanese companies achieved such a dramatic change by privately imposing strict quality 
norms. They formed export cartels which provided product quality guarantees. In particular, they set product design 
and quality standards; established industry brand names; guaranteed delivery schedules; and mediated the disputes 
between exporters and foreign buyers. 
20 In order to be eligible to the IDA resources, a country has to meet two criteria. First, its relative poverty defined as 
GNI per capita as to be below an established threshold which is updated annually (in fiscal year 2010: $1,135). 
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 CPR        CPIA          CPIA        Portfolio 
CPIA    stands for the clusters A through C of the CPIA; CPIA  for the cluster D; and 
Portfolio for the portfolio performance rating. 
The IDA allocation formula is then computed as follows: 
 IDA Country Allocation   ⌊CPR    Population    (
Gini
Population
)
      
⌋ 
In the last part of this article, I study alternative tools to the CPIA to allocate aid in the 
most effective way. 
(A) EXISTING ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS TO THE CPIA 
(a) KANBUR'S PROPOSAL 
Underlying that the CPIA implicitly relies too heavily on a uniform model of what 
works in development policy, Kanbur (2005) proposes to introduce outcome variables in the 
development aid allocation formula. 
Indeed, as it clearly appears from the formula, the IDA essentially captures needs 
through the income criterion, and does not go directly to indicators such as infant mortality, 
maternal mortality, girls' education and other components of the Millennium Development 
Goals. Moreover, the CPIA itself does not contain any final outcomes variables like poverty, 
extreme poverty, girls' enrollment, etc. What it has instead is a series of intermediate variables 
like trade policy, regulatory policy, property rights, corruption, etc. 
On the contrary, Kanbur (2005) argues in favor of an outcomes-based aid allocation, or 
at least in favor of introducing some outcome variables in the CPIA itself. 21 His main idea is to 
measure the needs side by side with the levels of the outcomes one is interested in, while 
measuring the performance side by side with the rate of improvement of these outcome 
variables over a given period of time up to the point of assessment, suitably normalized by the 
total aid flow over this period. He gives the following example: a country that has very low 
levels of girls' enrollment in primary schools should get more aid on grounds of need. But a 
country that is showing rapid improvements of girls' enrollment from this low level, relative to 
the aid it is receiving, should get even more. A country that is showing relatively slow rates of 
improvement should get relatively less on account of this measure of performance. The main 
advantage of this focus on outcomes is that it prevents the easy temptation of a “one-size-fits-
all” approach to development. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Second, it has to lack creditworthiness to borrow on market terms and therefore to need concessional resources to 
finance its development program. 
21 “While leaving the current IDA allocation methodology essentially intact, IDA should introduce one new category of scoring 
in the CPIA. This category should evaluate the evolution of an actual development outcome variable up to the present. The choice 
of variable is open.”  
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As he acknowledges himself, this proposal is in the spirit of Collier’s outcomes-based 
allocation (Collier et. al., 1997). They propose a basis for aid allocation in terms of retrospective 
assessment of a few major outcomes such as growth. They show how outcome measures can 
control for influences on growth over which the government has no control and argue that 
donors should switch from attempting to “purchase” a pre-specified menu of policy changes to 
the allocation of aid on the basis of periodic overall assessments of government achievements. 
Similarly, Barder and Birdsall (2006) defend the idea of “payments for progress,” the main 
objective being to link additional aid to clear evidence on progress already achieved on the 
ground. In order to do so, payments would be determined as a function of the outcomes and 
not linked to the implementation of any particular policies, any other intermediate outputs, or 
tied to purchases from particular suppliers or companies. 
(b) ADVANTAGES OF KANBUR'S PROPOSAL 
One of the main advantages of the Kanbur's proposal is that it relies on performance-
based measures—on actual performance—and so does not imply ex ante conditionality. Indeed, 
rating countries according to their rates of improvement of certain outcomes rather than 
according to their policies corresponds to an “ex post” approach of conditionality. From the 
point of view of this approach, one has to reward countries that used past aid well (ex post 
conditionality) without conditions (ex ante conditionality). This is in the spirit of the Paris 
Declaration (2005) and of the following Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) (2008): 
 Developing countries and donors will work together at the international level to review, 
document and disseminate good practices on conditionality with a view to reinforcing country 
ownership and other Paris Declaration Principles by increasing emphasis on harmonized, results-
based conditionality”  
This is an important improvement on the CPIA since, as I underline above, using ex ante 
conditionality is a very inefficient way to allocate aid. 
Moreover, the Kanbur's proposal is a useful improvement since it underlines that the 
CPIA relies excessively on a “one-size-fits-all” approach to development and proposes a way to 
overcome this difficulty with the use of outcome variables. Finally, his proposal is very well 
argued and he anticipates various criticisms. 
(c) LIMITS OF KANBUR'S PROPOSAL 
Given all the advantages of the Kanbur's proposal, the only criticism made by Buiter 
(2007) to this proposal that seems acceptable is the one according to which realized past 
outcome changes as a measure of future aid productivity: “the aid could have been looted, diverted 
or wasted, that is, not even spent on any activity likely to boost the indicator, and the improvement in the 
indicator could have been produced by domestic or foreign factors that have nothing to do with the aid 
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dispensed during the benchmark period, but never mind....”22 In other words, the Kanbur's proposal 
relies on the implicit assumption that past output indicators are a good guide to future aid 
productivity. And this is still to be shown. 
Similarly, McGillivray (2004) underlines that Kanbur (2005)'s proposal does not really 
provide an understanding of what makes aid works. This is why he argues in favor of more 
radical changes to the IDA formula than outlined in the Kanbur's proposal. According to him, 
what is required is a better knowledge of what makes aid work and the revisions to aid 
allocation formula should be considered in this light. 
(B) THE NEED FOR AN AID PRODUCTIVITY MEASURE 
What emerges clearly from the criticisms of both the CPIA and the Kanbur proposal—
and more generally of any outcomes-based allocation—is that what is needed is an aid 
productivity measure. The CPIA is not an aid productivity measure, being excessively focused 
on a “one-size-fits-all” approach of development. An outcomes-based allocation would not 
overcome this difficulty. In order to overcome it, one needs to establish a clear statistical link 
between past outcomes and future aid productivity. This has never been done and seems hardly 
feasible. Indeed, this supposes first to evaluate the elasticity of this outcome variable with 
respect to aid (which can be interpreted as aid productivity). Second, this supposes to evaluate 
the elasticity of aid productivity with respect to past changes in this outcome variable. In both 
steps of the estimation, one would be faced with endogeneity and omitted variables concerns. 
Moreover, in case one would like to introduce not one but various measures of outcomes, the 
estimation would be even more complicated by the fact that these outcomes may be 
interdependent. And then it remains to determine the optimal weight to give to each of these 
outcomes. 
Well aware of all these difficulties but at the same time of the real need for an aid 
productivity measure, I discuss below a new way to approaching this issue. The idea is to use 
directly aid effectiveness as such a measure. 
(a) A NEW APPROACH: USING AID EFFECTIVENESS TO ALLOCATE AID 
EFFECTIVELY 
Aid effectiveness has to be defined with respect to a given outcome, which has to be 
chosen by donors when they establish their selectivity criteria. This can be the growth rate of the 
economy; the reduction in the poverty rate; the rate of girls' enrollment or other goals 
depending both on donors’ priorities and recipient countries specificities. Aid is said to be very 
effective if aid elasticity with respect to the outcome is very high. For example, if the outcome is 
the growth rate, the higher aid elasticity with respect to growth—i.e. the more the growth rate 
increases for each increase in the aid flows received—the more aid is effective. 
                                                     
22 Similarly, Collier et. al. (1997) acknowledge that “one disadvantage with switching from policies to outcomes is that 
it can reward good luck.” 
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Generally, in order to compute aid effectiveness, one would like to estimate the 
following equation for each country   and year  : 
( )   Outcome        
Aid
GDP  
          
Where      N(    
 ) 
    measures aid effectiveness. Outcome   is the outcome of interest (for example the 
growth rate of per capita GDP) and 
Aid
GDP  
are the aid flows normalized by GDP.     is a vector of 
control variables.     is a year-country shock. All the coefficients in equation (2) are time-
varying, which is why I write     to denote the coefficient on aid in country $i$ at year $t$. 
The difficulty comes from the fact that with the econometric methods that are usually 
used the equation one estimates is not (2) but: 
( )   Outcome       
Aid
GDP  
          
Where      N(    
 ) 
That is, one only computes one coefficient for each country   and the entire time period 
(    ) and not one coefficient country   and year   (   ). In other words, one cannot estimate aid 
effectiveness annually. 
One way to estimate aid effectiveness annually—to implement the estimation of 
equation (2)—is to use the “local Gaussian-weighted ordinary least squares” method (used for 
example by Aghion and Marinescu (2007)). The basic idea of this method—which is also called 
kernel-based nonparametric regression or local smoothing—is to put more weight on the most 
recent years. For each year, points that are closer in time are given more weight than points that 
are further away. More precisely, all the observations are weighted by a Gaussian centered at 
date   but, since to estimate aid effectiveness in   one only wants to use the information 
available for the years preceding  , I put a zero weight on the years following  . 
Under this method, jumps in the coefficient   are mainly due to changes in the 
immediate neighborhood of date  , as those observations in the immediate neighborhood of 
date   are given highest weight. Hence, if there is a change in the aid effectiveness coefficient in 
 —say an increase—this comes from the fact that the country has improved its effective use of 
aid in  . And so in terms of aid allocation, it has to be rewarded for this improvement.  
Using the local Gaussian-weighted ordinary least squares method, one could thus 
estimate an aid effectiveness coefficient for each country and each year. However, aid can be 
endogenous which can lead to biased results.23 In order to deal with these endogeneity 
problems, one can use Gaussian-weighted two-stage least squares instrumenting for aid. It is 
                                                     
23 This endogenity can come from (i) reverse causation: growth causes aid (e.g. the higher its growth rate, the less aid 
a country receives because it does not need it); or (ii) simultaneous causation: an omitted variable causes both aid and 
growth. 
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however important to underline that the relevance of the method is totally independent of the 
instrument choice. 
Using Gaussian-weighted two-stage least squares, one could thus obtain a time-varying 
measure of aid effectiveness, with one coefficient per year and per country. These coefficients 
can be interpreted as an estimate of aid elasticity with respect to the outcome of interest, i.e. a 
measure of the country performance with respect to aid effectiveness. This tool could thus be 
used to reward good “aid performer.” Doing so, it helps overcome one of the main weaknesses 
of the outcomes-based allocations that have been proposed until now in the literature: it does 
not reward good luck. Indeed, a country can have one given year for example a very high 
growth rate and at the same time obtain a very low coefficient for aid effectiveness if it did not 
use aid in an effective way. In this case, its aid allocation decreases despite its good growth 
performance. The tool I propose only relies on the implicit assumption that past aid 
effectiveness is a good guide to future aid effectiveness. This is a weaker and more relevant 
assumption than the one according to which past output indicators are a good guide to future 
aid effectiveness. 
One can also choose to normalize the coefficients obtained using local Gaussian-
weighted ordinary least squares by the “global” aid effectiveness coefficient obtained by 
performing equation (3) for all the countries of the sample taken together (cross-countries 
regression with country fixed effects). Another possibility could be, rather than to normalize by 
the cross-countries coefficient, to take into account for each country the performance of its 
neighbors, for example using the geographical distance. Indeed, there may be some externalities 
created by an increase or a decrease in aid effectiveness in a country for its neighbors. 
A possible caveat of such a measure is that it does not take into account how donors can 
have an impact on aid effectiveness. Implicit here is indeed the assumption that aid 
performance is only the consequence of decisions of the recipient country itself and not of 
somebody else. But aid effectiveness does not depend only on the behavior of the recipient 
countries but also on the donor's behavior and one does not want recipients to suffer from bad 
behavior of donors. One possibility would be to control for an index of donor performance. 
Similarly, aid effectiveness can be affected by events not depending only on the 
recipient's economic policy, for example exogenous shocks like natural disasters. One would 
have to be very careful in controlling for these exogenous shocks. 
Despite these caveats, I think that using and aid effectiveness coefficient—together with 
other indicators—to allocate aid would be a relevant tool. Indeed, with such a tool, one does not 
give aid to countries that are the best performers for example in the sense of having a higher 
rate of girls' enrollment and so perhaps are not the one which need it the most, but to the 
countries where aid will be used in the most efficient way. That is to say, to the countries that 
have a sufficient absorptive capacity for receiving higher aid flows. It could help allocating a 
scarce resource in the most efficient way. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
In this article I question the relevance of the different measures of policy performance 
that are currently used. I evaluate more especially the pertinence of the CPIA and of the various 
alternatives that have been proposed in the literature. 
Using a yearly panel dataset over 146 countries between 1977 and 2008, I show that the 
CPIA is correlated with current growth rates but that it is not a good predictor for future 
economic growth. I thus argue in favor of other measures of policy performance. I underline the 
need of introducing new criteria when measuring policy performance. In particular, I show that 
more weight has to be given to the role of the government in the development process, which 
supposes to take into account its fiscal capacity. Fiscal capacity is indeed of crucial importance 
for raising domestic tax revenues. I also underline the importance of the quality of industrial 
policy and especially of export promotion strategies on the path towards sustained growth.  
I then focus more specifically on the allocation of development aid which is of great 
importance given both the scarcity and need for aid. I show that performance-based measures, 
as opposed to measures implying ex ante conditionality, are more accurate instruments for aid 
allocation. However, performance-based measures proposed in the literature do not help 
overcome the difficulty of estimating the elasticity of aid effectiveness with respect to outcome-
based performance indicators. They let unsolved the question of whether when a donor 
rewards a recipient for its good performance with respect to a given outcome variable it is not 
rewarding “luck” rather than an effective use of aid. 
Since in order to allocate aid effectively it appears essential to evaluate the elasticity of 
aid effectiveness with respect to performance indicators, I discuss a new tool based on this 
elasticity. Using new econometric methods, I show that one could use a time-varying measure 
of aid effectiveness as an indicator of the performance of a country with respect to aid 
efficiency. This tool shares with an outcome-based allocation the advantage of not relying on ex 
ante conditionality. Moreover, it is an improvement upon this outcome-based approach since it 
is a way to reward good “aid performer” rather than good “luck.” 
Needless to say, more research on aid effectiveness indicators is necessary before they 
can be applied. The tool could indeed be used by different donors with different goals (growth, 
poverty, education and so on.). This is an important characteristic because different criteria can 
be used given the complexity of the relationship between aid, growth and poverty reduction, 
depending on the recipient country specificities and on the donor preferences. The downside is 
that aid effectiveness coefficients might be too volatile to be used as single indicators. In my 
view, the most promising avenue is to use them together with other key development indicators 
such as investment in fiscal capacities. 
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APPENDIX: DATA SOURCES AND DESCRIPTION 
Aid: Net Aid Transfers (NAT). Source: DAC. 
CPIA: Country Policy and Institutional Assessment. Annual performance assessment of its 
client countries' capacity to effectively absorb development assistance carried out by the World 
Bank since 1977. Source: World Bank. 
Per capita GDP growth rate: Annual percentage growth rate of per capita GDP at market prices 
based on constant local currency. Source: WDI. 
M2 (percent GDP): Money and quasi money comprise the sum of currency outside banks, 
demand deposits other than those of the central government, and the time, savings, and foreign 
currency deposits of resident sectors other than the central government. Source: WDI. 
UNus: Annual correlation of voting records in UNGA between recipient and the US (-1 to 1). 
Source: Erik Voeten. 
Table 4: CPIA Criteria 2008 
A. Economic Management 
1. Macroeconomic Management 
2. Fiscal Policy 
3. Debt Policy 
B. Structural Policies 
4. Policies and Institutions for Economic Cooperation, Regional Integration & Trade 
5. Financial Sector 
6. Business Regulatory Environment 
C. Policies for Social Inclusion/Equity 
7. Gender Equality 
8. Equity of Public Resource Use 
9. Building Human Resources 
10. Social Protection and Labor 
11. Environmental Policies and Regulations 
D. Governance Rating: Public Sector Management and Institutions 
1. Property Rights and Rule-based Governance 
2. Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management 
3. Efficiency of Revenue Mobilization 
4. Quality of Public Administration 
5. Transparency, Accountability, and Corruption in the Public Sector 
 
Source: World Bank, 2008 
